Here is the question that set Socrates apart from all others of his day. A question that sets Philosophy apart from religion and a question that Socrates could not answer. He died without an answer. Plato devised an answer but Socrates had not reached that point at his death.
Do we call those acts good because the gods do them or do the gods do them because they are good? Are acts good just because the gods do them and whatever a god does is good just because the god did it?
Or, are certain acts good and that is why a god does it? Most people of Socrates time could not understand the import of the question. If the gods do what they do because it is good then there would be a standard for goodness, which even the gods would answer to and it would exist apart from the gods to be held over them for the sake of judgment. But for the Greeks there was nothing above the gods. Many people who believe in a single deity also hold for such a theory. Perhaps you think so too.
Consider : For those who believe in the One God of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic Tradition are the commandments of this God good because God commands them or is there a standard of Goodness which even God must follow? Do all rules come from God? Does everything come from God? Can God make a square circle? If God makes a universe with blue in it and with yellow in it can it exist without green in it?
If God were to do something horrible would it make it good because God was doing it, say killing an entire town, killing nearly every living being on earth, including innocent beings, ordering a father to kill his son? Are these good things?
Are the laws and rules of the physical universe and mathematics rules that even God must follow? Do they exist above or before God?
Where would they exist or come from? You hear a story about a mother who has killed her own daughter. She claims she heard God order her to do so. This happens! Do you think that yes, she heard God say that and so it was Good for her to kill her daughter or do you think that there is something wrong with that woman? Do you think she may be suffering from a chemical imbalance in her brain or some other ailment but that it can not be true that God told her to do it because God would not do such a thing, because it is wrong, even horrible and God just would not do evil things?
Well, where does this standard come from? Where are the rules about what is Good? If they are from God, God can make them and God can change them. Socrates and many other Greeks were making judgments about the stories of the gods. They knew that certain acts of the gods should be followed and others definitely avoided. Socrates was searching for a basis to affirm the existence of a moral standard or set of rules that even the gods are subject to.
This is known as Ethics in Philosophy. The stories of the gods had too many contradictions in them and it became too difficult to believe in them. As many must eventually give up a belief in Santa Claus, so too did they need to give up their belief in the gods.
But just as a belief in Santa Claus is comforting and brings physical gifts, belief in the gods was comforting for it provided a basis for a moral order. Once belief in the gods was removed, what would the Greeks put in its place?
What would serve as the basis for the social and moral order? Socrates was searching for it at the time of his death. Plato thought he had found it. More on this latter. E Translated by Benjamin Jowett in any one of these locations. Here is a presentation of the dialogue with a listing of topics within it.
Cartoon very short version: at youtube site Why was he there? What was it all about? Why did he make the defense that he did? Why did they convict him? Why did they sentence him to death? If Socrates was such a good person, someone who was pursuing truth and goodness and wisdom, how could it be that he would be executed by fellow citizens?
Socrates is just over 70 years of age at the time he is accused of a crime. He had never before been accused of anything wrong or criminal. He had served as a justice but never been a defendant. He was very well known. He was at least regarded as a great thinker, something of a scientist for his musings on the nature of the universe and as a moralist for all his talk about virtue. Who were his accusers and why did they charge him?
The accuser went to the town hall and presented the charge along with a requested penalty. Accuser : Meletus. Charge: Impiety-disbelieveing in the gods of the Athenians and corrupting the young.
Penalty: Death. Meletus would serve as the prosecutor and present his charges at the trial and the evidence against the accused, Socrates. Meletus was a conservative, something of a religious fanatic who had also brought charges against the orator, Andocides. Lycon, an orator, supported Meletus in bringing the charges. He appearsas a member of the group which organized the overthrow of the thirty Tyrrants and the creation of the democratic order.
Anytus, the leader of the democratic government, may have been the principle instigator of the charges. He may have invited Meletus to bring the charges. Anytus was concerned with the ability of the Democracy to survive. In some way Socrates was perceived as a threat to the political order and thus to the leaders of the democratic movement.
They declared an amnesty for any and all crimes that may have been committed during the previous few years that the tyrants had been inducing people into crimes in order to silence their criticisms and gain their support. Now the democratic order did not rest upon the leaders being noble born. It did not rest upon the power of the military. The Athenians had governments run by kings, military commanders and wealthy people. Now they were ruling themselves.
They rested that form opf government on the will of the people and their willingness to accept that whatever the majority wanted would be the correct thing to do. This democracy did not involve the voting of all Athenians.
The voting in Athens included only: males, born of Athenian mothers, born free, and born legitimate, no bastards! Those men would vote on all matters and the majority would rule.
Socrates presented a threat to the Democratic Party and form of government. Socrates had for many years been asking questions and he kept asking questions hoping to get the correct, final and truthful answer. He asked a series of questions that were threatening to the political order because they focused directly on the basic principle underlying the democratic rule.
The answers to the questions below were the same in BC as they are today. Even today to push this issue would result in someone be criticized for being anti-democratic or anti-American!
EUTHYPHRO: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice. EUTHYPHRO: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state.
The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything. SOCRATES: If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly, and would have been ashamed before men, but now I know well that you believe you have clear knowledge of piety and impiety.
So tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide what you think it is. Plot Summary. All Characters Socrates Euthyphro Meletus. All Symbols Daedalus. LitCharts Teacher Editions. Teach your students to analyze literature like LitCharts does. Detailed explanations, analysis, and citation info for every important quote on LitCharts. The original text plus a side-by-side modern translation of every Shakespeare play. Sign Up. Already have an account?
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Our Teacher Edition on Euthyphro can help. Themes All Themes. Symbols All Symbols. Theme Wheel. Everything you need for every book you read. The way the content is organized and presented is seamlessly smooth, innovative, and comprehensive. Themes and Colors. LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in Euthyphro , which you can use to track the themes throughout the work. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?
But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them.
Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious? Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked.
For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off? I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished? Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when? And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished? But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust.
Is not that true? Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very dear indeed to you. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. For granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.
But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety? Why not! But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say? We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies? Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this.
And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers.
Do you not agree? Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering? And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods? And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him.
But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one theophiles is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other osion is loved because itis of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the attribute of being loved by all the gods.
But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel and what is impiety? I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them,seem to turn round and walk away from us. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancesto Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where theyare placed because I am a descendant of his.
But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed.
But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.
Tell me, then-Is not that which is pious necessarily just? And is, then, all which is just pious? And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger.
But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean.
The poet Stasinus sings-. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear.
But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now? That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part.
Do you dissent? Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides.
In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men. For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things.
For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
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